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National surveys have shown that industrial chemical manufacturers
fail to provide information identifying ingredients and warning of hazards
with most of their products.' This practice leads workers to expose them-
selves unknowingly to chemical dangers, leaves them unaware of the true
1. A national survey conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) in 1972 found that 85,000 chemical products, accounting for 70% of workers' exposures,
were labeled by trade names only. Neither employees nor employers knew the actual identities of the
chemicals in 90% of these trade name products. Nearly 50% of trade name products contained chemi-
cals regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and slightly over 5%
contained suspected carcinogens. Toxic Chemicals in the Workplace: Hearing before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) (statement of James Melius,
M.D., Chief of Hazard Evaluation, NIOSH).
In 1977, NIOSH estimated that 21 million workers were exposed to trade name or generically
marketed products containing toxic chemicals. See HousE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, FAILURE
TO MEET COMMITMENTS MADE IN THE OSH AcT, H.R. REP. No. 710, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1977) [hereinafter 1977 OvERSIGHT REPORT], citing NIOSH, THE RIGHT TO KNOW 16 (1977).
In 1982, an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) survey found that none of the small firms
surveyed, and only 20% of larger firms, used labels revealing chemical identities rather than merely
trade names. U.S. EPA, Analysis of Present Labeling Practices (unpublished), cited in Hadden, La-
beling of Chemicals to Reduce Risk, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. Pioas., Summer 1983, at 235, 246.
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causes of chemically induced diseases,2 and gives rise to injuries,3 prema-
ture deaths," lost productivity, and medical and social welfare costs.5
After years of delay," OSHA' in 1983 promulgated the Hazard Com-
munication Standard (HCS).8 HCS requires chemical manufacturers to
provide warnings with products they deem to be dangerous. Except for
prescribing that a relatively small list of proven carcinogens must be la-
beled as hazardous,9 HCS leaves decisions about the elements and scope of
2. See P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)
(workers not informed of known hazards of asbestos for 30 years); W. RANDALL & S. SOLOMON,
BUILDING Six: THE TRAGEDY AT BRIDESBURG 107 (1977) (workers not informed of carcinogen
responsible for deaths in plant for nine years); W. ViscusI, RISK By CHOICE 71 (1983) (empirical
evidence shows few firms make comprehensive efforts to inform workers of risks; rather, information
provided is aimed at lowering workers' assessments of their risk).
3. See generally N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 74-80 (1976) (describing wide variety
of harms caused by exposures to hazardous substances, including poisoning, internal organ damage,
respiratory disease, cancer, and birth defects).
4. See id. at 79 (workers exposed to coke oven emissions are more than seven times more likely to
die from kidney cancer than general population); Charnalia, Current Concepts in Occupational Car-
cinogens, in PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL CANCER-INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 124 (1982) (in-
cidence of lung cancer in chromate industry workers is 25 times higher than in other industries, and
in nickel industry, five times higher); Schottenfeld & Haas, Carcinogens in the Workplace, in CAN-
CER-CAUSING CHEMICALS 14 (1981) (work-related asbestos exposure will cause two million cancer
deaths in next 40 years).
5. For example, the major sources of income for victims of occupational diseases are social secur-
ity, received by 53%, and welfare, received by 16%. The Department of Labor predicts that rising
numbers of chemical exposures will place a major burden on health care and income maintenance
programs. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL DiS-
EASES 2-4 (1980).
6. OSHA first began to develop a hazard labeling rule in response to a recommendation by
NIOSH in 1974. See Hazard Communication, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,092, 12,095 (1982). OSHA received
its advisory committee's recommendations for the text of a standard in 1975. Id. at 12,096. Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), OSHA is required to publish a proposed rule within
60 days of receipt of its advisory committee's report, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1982), but OSHA did not
publish a preliminary chemical labeling proposal until 1981. See Hazard Identification, 46 Fed. Reg.
4,412 (1981). This proposal was quickly withdrawn when President Reagan took office. 46 Fed. Reg.
12,020 (1981). See also HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, OMB INTERFERENCE WITH OSHA
RULEMAKING, H.R. Doc. No. 583, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-6 (1983) (discussing ex parte meetings
between chemical companies and Office of Management and Budget that led to withdrawal of original
proposal). The present standard was offered in its place in 1983, Hazard Communication, 48 Fed.
Reg. 53,280 (1983), and began to take effect in 1986.
7. OSHA was established by the OSH Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)), which defined OSHA's regulatory purpose and enforcement mecha-
nisms in broad terms. Thus, OSHA's decisions about which health standards to promulgate and how
to design them have largely been directed by factors other than statutory mandate. This is especially
true of HCS which, as OSHA acknowledged, was tailored to ensure preemption of more stringent
state "right-to-know" laws disliked by the chemical industry. See Hazard Communication Preamble,
48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 53,284 (1983) [hereinafter Preamble] (preemption of state laws chief goal of
HCS); Post-Hearing Comments of the Chemical Manufacturers Association 26 (Nov. 1, 1982) (on
file at OSHA Docket Office) (arguing that federal preemption of state chemical labeling laws was
imperative); see also infra note 11 (discussing preemption issue).
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(d)(3) & (4) (1987). This "floor" list is comprised of 2,311 chemicals.
OSHA Instruction CPL 2-2.38A, reprinted in 15 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 1312, 1325 (May
29, 1986). In contrast, the NIOSH Registry of the Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances classifies
more than 60,000 chemicals as potentially hazardous. In United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d
728 (3d Cir. 1985), the Public Citizen Litigation Group challenged the adequacy of this "floor,"
arguing that all chemicals on the NIOSH Registry should be regarded as presumptive hazards that
must be labeled. The court rejected this claim, upholding OSHA's view that the Registry was over-
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adequate evaluation procedures to the "professional judgment"1 of manu-
facturers.11 HOS presents a manufacturer with two options: It may decide
that a chemical is a health hazard and thereby obligate itself to comply
with extensive labeling and reporting requirements," or it may decide
that a product is not hazardous, and label it by trade or code names only.
Courts have held that HCS preempts overlapping provisions of state
"right-to-know" statutes,1 3 many of which contain more stringent hazard
inclusive, since not all chemicals on it are hazardous in common use. Id. at 739.
10. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 app. B (1987) ("chemical manufacturers ...are not required to
follow any specific methods for determining hazards"); Preamble, supra note 7, at 53,297-99. OSHA
specified some objective criteria for determining whether chemicals cause acute (immediate) health
effects, such as skin corrosiveness, and lethal dose levels, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 app. A (1987), but
left judgments about how to evaluate the chronic (long-term) effects of chemicals to manufacturers'
discretion. The agency stated that evaluators must consider animal and human studies, and must
report the results of studies they judge to be conducted according to "established scientific principles"
and to report "statistically significant" results, but declined to specify what constitutes "established
scientific principle" or acceptable levels of statistical significance. Id. at app. B.
Manufacturers must prepare and keep on file a written statement of the general procedure used to
evaluate chemicals, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(d)(6) (1987), but need not document the steps of each
evaluation performed.
11. OSHA may have felt compelled to leave decisions about whether chemicals were hazardous to
manufacturers' discretion in order to ensure that it would achieve its goal of preempting state right-to-
know laws through HCS. See supra note 7. In promulgating HCS, OSHA faced the Fifth Circuit's
ruling in Louisiana Chem. Ass'n v. Bingham, 657 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981), that any OSHA rule
covering potential, as opposed to confirmed, hazards could have the status only of a "regulation," not
of a "standard." This technical distinction had great importance because under the OSH Act only
"standards," 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982), explicitly preempt state laws covering the same matters, 29
U.S.C. § 667 (1982). "Regulations," defined as ancillary rules "deem[ed] necessary to carry out
[OSHA'sl responsibilities," 29 U.S.C. § 657(g)(2) (1982), have no such preemptive power, unless a
reviewing court finds that overlapping state laws would make it impossible to comply with federal law
or would obstruct the objectives of the Act. See New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774
F.2d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 1985). If OSHA had prescribed which substances should be considered
hazardous under HCS, it would have left the standard open to challenge for covering potential, as
well as confirmed, hazards. A ruling that the standard covered potential hazards, and therefore had
the status only of a regulation, would have deprived the standard of its preemptive effect over state
laws, thereby defeating one of OSHA's main goals in promulgating HCS. By leaving hazard evalua-
tions to manufacturers, OSHA protected HCS against being challenged for covering substances not
conclusively established to be hazardous. See also infra note 125 (discussing implications of Bingham
on OSHA's rulemaking authority).
12. Warning labels for products deemed to be hazardous must include the manufacturer's name
and address, an appropriate hazard warning, and the -identities of the hazardous ingredients, unless
they are claimed as trade secrets. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(0(1) & (i)(1) (1987). A safety data sheet
accompanying the product must list the identities of all hazardous ingredients (comprising 1% or more
of the product or 0.1% if carcinogenic), and provide a detailed explanation of potential hazards, a
statement of safety precautions, control measures, emergency procedures, the name of the party re-
sponsible for preparing the safety data sheet, and notation of all information the manufacturer lacks.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) (1987).
Manufacturers must attach warning labels to products they designate to be hazardous, 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1200(0(1) (1982), and must provide safety data sheets with dangerous products on first ship-
ment and whenever new hazard information becomes available. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12 0 0 (g)(6) (1987).
Employers purchasing products labeled as hazardous must ensure that manufacturers' labels remain
on containers, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(0(4)-(9) (1987), and must make manufacturers' safety data
sheets readily accessible to employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g)(8)-(9) (1987).
13. These statutes imposed varying chemical labeling, hazard reporting, worker training and com-
munity disclosure requirements on chemical manufacturers and employers. For a list of state right-to-
know statutes, see O'Reilly, Driving a Soft Bargain: Unions, Toxic Materials, and Right to Know
Legislation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rv. 307, 309 n.13 (1985).
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disclosure requirements.14
This Note argues that the wide discretion given manufacturers in per-
forming hazard evaluations under HCS renders the standard ineffective.1 5
Section I draws on "law and economics" theory" to identify two problems
14. E.g., Ohio Mfrs.' Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986) (HCS preempts
municipal ordinance coverage of manufacturers); Manufacturers Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 801
F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986) (HCS preempts most state law coverage of manufacturers); New Jersey State
Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985) (HCS preempts state law coverage ofr
manufacturers, but state may be able to develop own list of hazards requiring labels); United Steel-
workers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1985) (HCS preempts state law coverage of
manufacturers).
Most discussions of HCS have centered on the standard's preemption of state laws. See, e.g., Feit-
shans, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: How Much Does the Employee Have the "Right to
Know?" 1985 DET. C.L. REv. 697 (arguing that state right-to-know laws are better than HCS in
many respects, and should not and legally need not be preempted by federal standard); Schroeder &
Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72
GEo. L.J. 1231, 1288-91 (1984) (arguing that HCS need not preempt state statutes offering workers
greater protection); Tyson, The Preemptive Effect of the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard on
State and Community Right to Know Laws, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1010 (1987) (arguing that
HCS does preempt state and local laws); Note, Toward a Meaningful "Right-to-Know": Model Leg-
islation and Commentary, 9 SEroN HALL LEGiS. J. 621 (1986) (discussing preemption issue and
proposing model state right-to-know legislation).
Opposition to HCS preemption of state laws is understandable, given the inadequacy of the federal
standard. It is the premise of this Note, however, that a uniform federal standard is necessary to
ensure that all workers are protected from unknown hazards. State laws do not offer sufficient protec-
tion because many states lack right-to-know laws and others lack the resources or commitment to
enforce right-to-know laws already on their books.
Differing state laws on chemical labeling also place an unnecessary burden on chemical manufac-
turers, who must alter their labeling practices each time they ship products across state lines. Finally,
state regulation of chemical product labeling runs the risk of contravening the dormant commerce
clause. Cf Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (state's apple
labeling laws unconstitutional due to discriminatory effect on out-of-state growers, which had to bear
cost of changing labels).
15. Other commentators have criticized HCS for creating a loophole for manufacturers through
its trade secret provisions, and for restricting the range of workplaces covered to the manufacturing
sector. See, e.g., Feitshans, supra note 14, at 703-05, 712-15. These concerns were largely resolved
when the standard was reviewed in Auchter. Noting that exposure to toxic chemicals is not concen-
trated in the manufacturing sector but also poses serious problems for workers in hospital, construc-
tion, and other industries, 763 F.2d at 737, the court directed OSHA to reconsider applying HCS to
nonmanufactuing-sector employees. Id. at 739. It also required OSHA to redefine its trade secret
definitions to deny protection to chemical identity information discoverable through chemical analysis,
or "reverse engineering," of the product. Id. at 739-43. OSHA complied with these directives by
expanding the scope of HCS coverage to nonmanufacturing employees, Hazard Communication, 52
Fed. Reg. 31,852 (1987), and proposing to change its trade secret definitions, Hazard Communica-
tion, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,750 (1985).
16. Of course, an economic approach does not answer the myriad of political and moral questions
inherent in the problem of worker exposure to hazardous chemicals. Economic analysis can only help
in arriving at "efficient" outcomes; it cannot indicate whether outcomes conform to moral principles
such as fairness or justice, see Coleman, Eficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 509 (1980)-except where these values are tied to efficiency, cf. Schwartz, Proposals for Prod-
ucts Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357-58 (1988) (arguing that effi-
ciency is primary value underlying commercial transactions and should therefore govern products lia-
bility law rules).
Although economic analysis cannot illuminate many important aspects of policy decisions, it adds to
our understanding of how institutions work and helps to predict the feasibility and effects of proposed
changes in legal rules. Economic theory is particularly helpful in evaluating how to regulate activities
we wish not to ban outright, but to curtail so that their costs do not outweigh their benefits. For
example, eliminating the harms of toxic chemicals by completely -banning their production would be
infeasible, as these materials are needed to produce goods central to modern life, such as plastics,
computers and television sets. Instead, a balance must be achieved between the costs of industrial
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that give rise to inefficiencies in the industrial chemical market: market
incentives against hazard information disclosure, and the tort system's dif-
ficulty in imposing the costs of chemical harms on manufacturers.
Section II argues that HCS does not significantly alleviate these "mar-
ket failure" problems: Market incentives against hazard labeling outweigh
weak incentives to comply with the standard.17 OSHA officials have stated
that they intend to rely heavily on the private liability system to enforce
HCS, arguing that manufacturers can be expected to evaluate hazards
carefully to avoid tort liability for not doing so."8 Yet recent studies show
extensive noncompliance with HCS 9 Section II argues that manufactur-
ers fail to conduct careful hazard evaluations under HCS because the
standard does not require them to disclose product ingredients evaluated
as nonhazardous. This lack of ingredient information hinders interested
parties-such as industrial hygienists, workers' physicians, personal in-
jury lawyers and OSHA inspectors-from evaluating the adequacy of
manufacturers' hazard assessments. Section III argues that an effective
standard must permit such independent evaluations by requiring chemical
manufacturers to disclose product ingredients.2 Disclosure of ingredients
would make establishing a warning's inadequacy more feasible. Manufac-
turers would therefore have greater incentives to provide adequate hazard
chemical production and its benefits. Market mechanisms, reinforced by the tort system, are often
relied on to accomplish this tally. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 19 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
The political and moral values other than economic efficiency that are implicated by workplace
chemical exposure, see MacCarthy, A Review of Some Normative and Conceptual Issues in Occupa-
tional Safety and Health, 9 B.C. ENVTL. Art'. L. REV. 773 (1981) (summarizing moral issues), may
well suggest that protective measures other than those argued for here should be adopted. Cf. G.
CALABRESI, TRAGIC CHOIcES (1978) [hereinafter TRAGIC CHOICES] (examining various institutions
used to make decisions about loss of life and other tragic harms, and analyzing tradeoffs involved in
adoption of each alterative). This Note argues that current regulation fails to achieve even the more
modest goal of promoting "efficient" outcomes. (For a discussion of alternative definitions of effi-
ciency, see infra note 121).
17. The OSH Act denies private parties a cause of action to enforce its provisions, see 29 U.S.C. §
653(b)(4), but workers harmed by exposure to chemicals bearing inadequate warning labels can file
suit against product manufacturers. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
18. See Inadequacy, Quantity of Data Sheets Expected to be Greatest Problems with Rule, 15
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 423 (Oct. 24, 1985).
19. Studies show that many manufacturers are failing to comply with even the most basic provi-
sions of the standard, a finding described by one OSHA official as "incredible . . . for any new
federal standard." Problems with Standard's Basic Provisions Continue, Agency Official Tells Con-
ference, 16 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1040 (Mar. 4, 1987). The most recent tally found 28,059
violations of various HCS provisions. See Employers' Basic Compliance Problems Unchanged with
Hazard Communication Rule, 17 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1046 (Dec. 9, 1987).
20. One commentator has recognized the benefits of chemical ingredient disclosure in the collective
bargaining context. See Note, Workplace Exposure to Toxic Chemicals: Information Disclosure Ver-
sus Trade Secret Protection, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 149, 154-55 (1984-85). The
merits of ingredient disclosure as a regulatory approach have been disregarded, however. See, e.g.,
Preamble, supra note 7, at 53,299 (dismissing ingredient disclosure as option in designing HCS);
O'Reilly, supra note 13, at 314, 317 (1985) (chemical identity information is too technical to be
useful to workers and harms their economic interests as well as employers'); Schroeder & Shapiro,
supra note 14, at 1277, 1280 (suggesting that "mere possession of chemical identity . . . may be of
limited use").
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warnings, as they would face a greater likelihood of being sued by private
parties or being fined by OSHA for failure to provide them.
Section IV examines the argument, advanced by opponents of ingredi-
ent disclosure, that such a requirement would destroy valuable trade se-
cret information. The extent to which ingredient disclosure would jeop-
ardize trade secrets has been greatly exaggerated, and bona fide trade
secrets can be protected though carefully tailored agency procedures. The
benefits of an ingredient disclosure rule therefore suggest that Congress
should pass legislation directing OSHA to add such a requirement to
HCS.
I. MARKET FAILURE: THE RATIONALE FOR HCS
In its Preamble to HCS, OSHA justified HCS as a market adjustment
mechanism.21 This rationale is based on the premise that government reg-
ulation is not needed as long as a balance between safety and the costs of
preventing product harm is achieved through the market. When this bal-
ance breaks down, government intervention may be necessary."
In a theoretically perfect market, products are manufactured and used
only to the extent that their total costs, including the costs of harms caused
by them, do not exceed their value to purchasers.13 In an efficient market
for industrial chemicals, for example, purchasers"' would continue to buy
and use hazardous products up to the point at which the total costs of
these products began to surpass their value. At this point, purchasers
would switch to cheaper substitutes. 5
Manufacturers therefore have incentives to improve product safety so as
to lower products' costs and make them more attractive to buyers."6 Such
safety efforts can take many forms, including development of new, safer
21. Preamble, supra note 7, at 53,323-24.
22. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 343-45 (3d ed. 1986).
23. In this respect, markets can serve as a rough "testing ground" for industrial activities-such
as the manufacture of exotic synthetic chemicals-that may or may not be worth their full costs to
society. The market performs a type of experiment: If firms engaged in the activity remain in business
even though the full costs of the activity are being charged to them, then the value of that activity must
be greater than its total costs. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 16, at 19, 68; W. LANDES & R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 115 (1987) (discussing strict liability).
24. In the case of industrial chemical products, purchasers are generally other industries, which
employ workers who may be harmed by exposure to these products. Throughout this-Note, "manufac-
turers" will be used to refer to firms that produce industrial chemical products; "employers" or "pur-
chasers" will be used to refer to firms that purchase these products; and "workers" will be used to
refer to employees of both purchasers and manufacturers of industrial chemicals.
25. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 293-94, 296.




products,2 7 reduction in production levels for hazardous products,2" re-
search into hazards,29 and provision of safety information with products.
Manufacturers will invest in improving the safety of their products up to
the point at which their expenditures on safety begin to exceed their ex-
penditures resulting from product harms.
In order for manufacturers to feel competitive pressure to increase
product safety, purchasers must have information allowing them to choose
between competing items on the basis of the products' relative safety. Pur-
chasers may obtain safety information in either of two ways: Manufactur-
ers, the government, consumer groups or other sources may provide it;
alternatively, hazard levels may be reflected in product -prices-provided
that the costs of product harms are imposed on manufacturers.30 If prod-
uct hazards are not revealed through either of these potential information
sources, buyers will make ill-informed purchasing decisions, creating an
inefficient product market, or "market failure."
A. Market Failure Due to the Peculiarities of Information Markets
Absent a legal duty to do so, manufacturers lack incentives to disclose
product hazards because doing so will make their products less attractive
to buyers." Potential product purchasers should be willing to pay manu-
facturers or third parties for hazard information, but such information
may not be provided because markets for information often "fail." 8 Pro-
viders of valuable information may not obtain buyers for it because poten-
tial purchasers cannot judge the value of information until they have it;
yet once they have it, they no longer need to pay for it." Suppliers of
information also may be unable to capture its full value because it is diffi-
cult to prevent those who do not initially pay for information from ob-
taining it once it has been sold.3 Hoping to benefit from information
27. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 291-93.
28. See id. at 293.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 287; R. POSNER, supra note 22, at 166.
31. See S. SHAVELL, AN ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 55 (1987); Posner, The Federal Trade
Commission's Mandated-Disclosure Program, in BUSINESS DIScLOSuRE: GOVERNMENT'S NEED TO
KNOW 335 (H. Goldschmid ed. 1979) (manufacturers have disincentives to disclose hidden product
hazards because doing so benefits competitor manufacturers of nonhazardous substitute products).
Some manufacturers may want to disclose product information to show that their product is safer
than that of competitors. This incentive will be diminished, however, if such disclosure would raise
purchasers' awareness of the hazards of the general product class. See id. Similarly, manufacturers
will not want to publicize the safety of their products if competitors with equally safe products will
also benefit from such advertising. See R. POSNER, supra note 22, at 334.
32. For a general discussion of the economics of information, see R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW &
ECONOMICS 112-16 (1988). For a discussion of information-transfer problems in employer-worker
relationships, see W. VIScUSI, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS 121-22 (1979) (employers may not disclose
workplace hazard information, even if workers are willing to pay for it, because this information may
damage general reputation of firm, boost future wage rates, and induce workers to quit).
33. See R. CooTF. & T. ULEN, supra note 32, at 112; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note
23, at 132, 281.
34. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 32, at 112-13.
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without paying, potential purchasers may refrain from contributing for its
production, leading to the underprovision of valuable data.
Products liability law attempts to ensure that hazard information will
be provided despite these problems in information markets by imposing a
duty to warn on product manufacturers.3 5 Yet the tort system's difficulty
in imposing the costs of chemical harms on manufacturers has reduced the
effectiveness of this mechanism for compelling information disclosure.
B. The Tort System's Difficulty in Imposing Chemical Injury Costs on
Manufacturers
The tort system has difficulty imposing liability in cases involving expo-
sure to hazardous chemicals because of the difficulties of proving causation
in these cases.3 A long latency period typically characterizes the onset of
chemically induced diseases.3" Because of the length in time between ex-
posure and the first manifestation of harm, victims of chemical diseases
often do not recognize the true cause of their illness and do not file suit
against the manufacturers of the product that caused their injury.38 As
time passes, it may also become difficult or impossible to identify which of
many workplace products is responsible for an illness.3 Finally, unless
records are retained, injured workers may be unable to remember or es-
tablish the identity of the product manufacturer.40
These problems in the tort system41 produce inefficiencies in the indus-
35. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
36. A vast literature documents this problem. See, e.g., McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology,
and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 159, 166-75; Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law
and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1281-1300 (1980); Robinson, Probabilistic
Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 779-83 (1985); Schroeder
& Shapiro, supra note 14, at 1237-55; Note, Causation in Toxic Torts, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986);
Note, Tort Actions for Cancer, 90 YALE L.J. 840, 847-55 (1981); Note, Occupational Health Risks
and the Worker's Right to Know, 90 YALE L.J. 1792, 1792-95 (1981).
37. This latency period can extend for 20 to 30 years or longer. Preamble, supra note 7, at
53,323.
38. See, e.g., P. BRODEUR, supra note 2, at 267 (only 25% of people who developed asbestos
disease filed lawsuits due to low propensity to attribute disease to exposure dating back many years);
Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 1246 (low claim rates for brown lung disease show workers'
lack of awareness of claims arising from long-latent diseases caused by hazardous exposure); see also
Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 370 (1984) (dis-
cussing problems of tort-liability approach to harms with long latency periods).
39. Robinson, supra note 36, at 779-80, 784; Preamble, supra note 7, at 53,323.
40. Cf Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 600-01, 607 P.2d 924, 927-30, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 137-38 (1980) (noting impossibility of identifying DES manufacturers responsible for
individual cancer cases); P. BRODEUR, supra note 2, at 36 (describing case lost by plaintiff because he
could not remember on which jobs he used which manufacturers' asbestos products).
41. The exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation laws have also insulated manufac-
turers from bearing the full costs of product harms by denying workers any recovery other than
workers' compensation for workplace injuries. See Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 1244-50.
In recent years, however, judicial interpretation of these exclusive remedy provisions has begun to
change. Workers are now permitted to bring product liability suits against third-party manufacturers,
see, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), and, in some in-
stances, against the parent and sibling corporations of their employers, or employers acting in a "dual
[Vol. 97: 581
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trial chemical market. Product prices are lower than they would be if the
full costs of product harms were reflected in price,"" leading to higher
levels of production and use of dangerous products and more injury from
them.43 Manufacturers' incentives to produce safer products or provide
safety and warning information with potentially dangerous ones are re-
duced.44 Without accurate information, purchasers of industrial chemical
products cannot avoid the costs they bear in using dangerous products"5 by
taking appropriate safety measures, such as substituting less hazardous
products, implementing training programs to educate workers about safety
precautions, or providing protective equipment. Workers lacking hazard
information cannot observe correct safety procedures, bargain with em-
ployers for appropriate safety precautions or wage premiums to compen-
sate for job risks,'4  or make informed decisions about the level of occupa-
tional risk they are willing to bear.47
capacity" as product manufacturer and employer, see, e.g., Mercer v. Uniroyal, 49 Ohio App. 2d 279,
361 N.E.2d 492 (1976). Workers who can prove that an employer intentionally concealed a work-
place hazard have also been permitted to sue employers directly. See P. BRODEUR, supra note 2, at
170 (approximately 1,000 lawsuits by asbestos workers penetrated exclusive remedy shield of workers'
compensation laws by suing Johns-Manville for fraud). See generally Note, Exceptions to the Exclu-
sive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. Rxv. 1641, 1649-50
(1983) (discussing trend away from exclusive remedy rule).
42. Of course, the full costs of such harms, such as loss of infinitely valuable human life or dam-
ages to resources available for future generations, would not be recouped through strict liability. Even
when it functions well, the tort liability system can be said at best to impose approximate assessments
for these costs-to produce a result better than that which would obtain otherwise.
43. Cf. COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 16, at 70 (discussing accident-prone activities in
general).
44. See Shavell, supra note 38, at 363.
45. Although employers are immune from suit for workplace injuries under the workers' compen-
sation system, see supra note 41, use of harmful workplace chemicals does impose costs on them. For
large employers, premiums for workers' compensation coverage are often pegged to workplace injury
rates. See J. CHELIUS, WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY: THE ROLE OF WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION 26 (1977). Employers' hiring and training costs are also likely to be higher if they maintain
hazardous working conditions, because workers tend to quit jobs they perceive to be hazardous. See
W. Vmscusi, supra note 32, at 122. Finally, workplace injuries impose costs on employers in the form
of lost productivity from absenteeism and disability. See N. ASHFORD, supra note 3, at 17-18 (esti-
mating total of these costs to national economy).
46. The effect on wage rates of lack of hazard information depends on how accurately workers
currently estimate the overall danger of exposure to industrial chemical products. If workers overesti-
mate the risk these chemicals pose as a class, employers' current wage costs are higher than they
would be if accurate hazard information for specific products were available. If they underestimate
risk overall, wage costs are lower than they would be given accurate information. If workers correctly
estimate the risk of harm overall, provision of accurate information about specific products would not
alter wage levels on average, but would lead to an adjustment of wage rates to reflect particular job
risks more accurately.
47. S. SHAVELL, supra note 31, at 51 n.6. Not all workers have the option of quitting dangerous
jobs, however. Workers who possess bargaining power by virtue of their job skills or union member-
ship may demand wage premiums for job hazards or may quit to find less hazardous work. Yet
workers with few skills, little job mobility, and no collective bargaining power may be forced to hold
the least desirable jobs in the economy, including those involving serious chemical hazards. Cf. Davis
& Rowland, Problems Faced by Minority Workers, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 417 (B. Levy & D.
Wegman eds. 1983) (nonwhite workers concentrated in many of most hazardous industries and most
dangerous occupations within them); Mazorra, Migrants and Seasonal Agricultural Workers in OC-
CUPATIONAL HEALTH, supra, at 417, 423 (describing low wages and job hazards, such as exposure to
pesticides, faced by migrant farm workers); English, Sweatshops Are Back-And They're Thriving,
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 581
II. THE INADEQUACY OF HCS
HCS fails to induce manufacturers to provide careful hazard warnings
because it does not significantly counteract market incentives against pro-
vision of such warnings."' The special difficulties of proving causation in
hazardous chemical cases further reduce industrial chemical manufactur-
ers' incentives to provide proper warnings. Because victims will not sue if
they are unaware that their illness has a chemical origin, chemical manu-
facturers have an incentive to avoid warning users of the hazards of their
products.49 Because victims cannot win a suit if they cannot establish or
remember the identity of the product and the name of the manufacturer, 50
manufacturers have an incentive to market their products generically,
with a minimum of information identifying their maker." Withholding
chemical identities also makes it more difficult for potential litigants to
investigate the possible inadequacy of hazard warnings.
OSHA's claim that the private liability system will enforce HCS52
therefore has serious flaws. The threat of liability under HOS appears
largely equivalent to that already existing under common law duty-to-
warn standards.53 Under the common law, as under HCS, chemical man-
ufacturers must provide warnings and safety information for foreseeably
harmful products." Under both standards, manufacturers must meet the
evaluation standards of an expert,55 keep up to date on scientific litera-
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 16, 1984, at 68 (employer indicted for cyanide poisoning of workers
hired mostly illegal aliens on assumption that they would not complain about lethal working
conditions).
48. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., P. BRODEUR, supra note 2, at 142 (quoting a court finding that correspondence
between asbestos companies "'reflect[ed] a conscious effort by the industry in the 1930's to downplay,
or arguably suppress, the dissemination of information to employees and the public for fear of the
promotion of law suits' ").
50. The novel "market share" liability doctrine, under which liability was imposed on some DES
and asbestos manufacturers in proportion to their share of the market for these products, was devel-
oped to overcome this obstacle. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d
924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144 (1980) (noting that defendants' "conduct. . . played a significant
role in creating the unavailability of proof."). Although market share liability theories have been
accepted in several jurisdictions, courts in general have been unwilling to relax the traditional require-
ment that plaintiffs identify the specific defendants responsible for their harm. See R. CARTWRIGHT
& J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 957-67 (1986) (discussing cases).
51. See Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L.
REv. 713, 742 (1982).
52. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). Manufacturers are held
strictly liable for marketing products without safety directions or hazard warnings. Absence of this
information renders dangerous products "unreasonably dangerous." Id.
Failure to warn of foreseeable hazards also establishes liability under doctrines of negligence and
breach of implied warranty. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 96(2) (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
54. Under the common law of most jurisdictions, manufacturers can absolve themselves from
"strict" liability for failure to warn by showing that, given the state of scientific knowledge at the time
they marketed a product, they could not have known of its dangers. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
53, § 99 at 697. A few courts have even held that lack of foreseeability is not a defense. E.g., Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
55. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S
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ture,56 and provide warnings before a danger is established as a scientific
certainty.57
Yet in spite of the duty to warn under the common law, chemical man-
ufacturers have often resisted disclosing information about product
hazards. Examples of manufacturers' reluctance to declare products harm-
ful, even in the face of strong hazard evidence, include the cases of asbes-
tos,"8 bis-chloromethyl ether (BCME), " vinyl chloride,6" radium, 1 di-
oxin," and benzene.63 Under HCS, manufacturers can be expected to
continue to exercise such standards of professional judgment, classifying
the fewest products possible as hazardous."
If the deterrent effect of the private liability system -is insufficient to
counteract the strong incentives that discourage hazard labeling, the task
of enforcing compliance with HCS must fall back to OSHA.65 Yet given
OSHA's limited enforcement resources6 and the complexity of detecting
L.J. 521, 544-55 (1982).
56. Manufacturers are deemed to have constructive knowledge of any information, such as inedi-
cal journal articles, available at the time the product was marketed. E.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). As Bore illustrates, discovery of early medical literature
documenting the dangers of asbestos led to the first successful products liability suits against asbestos
manufacturers. See P. BRODEUt, supra note 2, at 52.
57. Manufacturers' duty to warn commences as soon as sufficient evidence exists "that a reasona-
ble man would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it."
Bore, 493 F.2d at 1088.
58. See P. BRODEUR, supra note 2, passim (although extensive evidence of hazards of asbestos
existed by 1930's, asbestos industry did not begin to use warning labels until 1964).
59. See W. RANDALL & S. SOLOMON, supra note 2, at 71, 105 (Rohm & Haas did not conclude
that BCME was carcinogen until 12 years after first evidence of high incidence of cancer deaths
among workers, and played down significance of animal tests showing BCME to be one of most
potent carcinogens ever tested).
60. See Chemical Hazards at Work (panel discussion), 9 HARV. ENVTL L. REv. 331, 344 (1985)
(B.F. Goodrich withheld data about hazards of vinyl chloride until after deaths of three of its employ-
ees from liver cancer).
61. See Nugent, The Power to Define a New Disease: Epidemiological Politics and Radium
Poisoning, in DYING FOR WORK 177, 179 (D. Rosner & G. Markowitz eds. 1987) (radium industry
refused to accept early study attributing illness and death among watch dial painters to radium
poisoning).
62. See Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 1237-38 n.50 (manufacturers of dioxin and ben-
zene suppressed hazard information about their products).
63. See id.; see also D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JoB 83-94 (1978); S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS
OF CANCER 102, 107 (1978) (both citing examples of manufacturers' suppression of hazard data).
64. This problem is already occurring. See, e.g., Carcinogen Classifications Need Review, 16
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 148 (July 17, 1986) (some manufacturers do not label 29 known
carcinogens because these chemicals do not appear on HCS "floor" list).
HCS establishes the elements of an adequate warning label, see supra note 12, and thus may
increase a manufacturer's vulnerability to private lawsuits once the firm decides to classify a product
as hazardous. See G. NOTHSTEIN, THE LAW OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 548-52
(1983) (discussing admissibility of proof of violations of OSHA standards to establish negligence).
Yet this feature of HCS deters, rather than encourages, hazard labeling. By classifying a product as
hazardous and revealing its identity, a manufacturer opens itself to potential liability for failing to
report all of the safety information required under HCS.
65. To enforce hazard evaluation standards, OSHA could request chemical identity information
from manufacturers and then employ expert industrial hygienists to review the adequacy of manufac-
turers' hazard evaluations. The agency could fine manufacturers for inadequate evaluations under the
procedures defined in the OSH Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 658-660 (1982).
66. OSHA has far too few inspectors to police compliance effectively. See L. BACOW, BARGAIN-
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and proving noncompliance with HCS's vague "professional judgment"
standard," administrative enforcement of HCS promises to be difficult."
The threat of agency enforcement therefore provides little incentive for
compliance, as the unusually high rate of noncompliance with HCS al-
ready indicates.69
III. A REMEDIAL PROPOSAL: REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF CHEMICAL
INGREDIENTS
The hazard warning provisions of HCS fail to create strong compliance
incentives through either tort liability or administrative enforcement, as
discussed above. An effective standard must either permit better policing
of the standard by OSHA, or allow for private monitoring of the ade-
quacy of hazard warnings. Adding an ingredient disclosure requirement to
HCS would have both these effects."0 Such a requirement would increase
ING FOR JOB SAFETY & HEALTH 13 (1980) (OSHA has only 1,560 inspectors to monitor compliance
in five million work places, making it incapable of inspecting more than two percent of all firms it
regulates each year); Noble, For OSHA, Balance is Hard to Find, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1988, at ES,
col. 1 (number of compliance inspectors has declined to approximately 1,000).
67. See W. Viscusi, supra note 2, at 20 (OSHA detects far fewer health risk violations than
safety violations due to complex and time-consuming nature of health risk assessment); MSDS Carcin-
ogen Designation Not Limited to NTP and IARC Lists, 16 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 539 (Oct.
22, 1986) (OSHA official concedes that agency lacks resources to confirm adequacy of manufacturers'
hazard evaluations).
68. Under the Act, manufacturers may contest fines by appealing to the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1982), and then to a federal court of appeals, 29
U.S.C. § 660 (1982). Defending appeals of fines for violating the vague "professional judgment"
standard of HOS would require additional agency resources.
69. See supra note 19.
70. Two alternative proposals for hazard warning rules have been suggested by policymakers, but
neither adequately considers the severe resource limitations faced by administrative agencies. H.R.
162, recently passed by the House, see 133 CONG. REC. H8692-712 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1987), and
now pending in the Senate, would establish a board within NIOSH to evaluate all potential work-
place chemical hazards, identify the workers at risk of harm from exposure to them, and then notify
these workers of their risk. This effort by Congress to remedy the deficiencies of HCS is commenda-
ble, but probably unrealistic. OSHA's poor track record suggests that agency efforts to evaluate
hazards on a substance-by-substance basis will be unsuccessful. See 1977 OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra
note 1, at 14 (criticizing OSHA for having set complete standards for only 16 substances, and partial
standards for only 400 others, in its first six years). Other factors also suggest that a scheme placing
the burden of hazard evaluation and notification on an agency will be infeasible. An agency would
have to evaluate the huge number of industrial substances currently in use in the United States and
then keep pace with the rapid development of new synthetic chemicals. See Schroeder, Forward: A
Decade of Change in Regulating the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1983, at 1, 6 (55,000 to 63,000 chemicals currently in commercial use in United States; EPA receives
1,000 notices of intent to market new chemicals each year). The great number and diversity of Ameri-
can workplaces would further increase the difficulty of implementing such a centrally administered
scheme. See L. BAcow, supra note 66, at 13.
Another chemical labeling plan, proposed during the Carter Administration, see Hazard Identifica-
tion, 46 Fed. Reg. 4,412 (1981), would have required manufacturers to follow a specified procedure
in evaluating hazards. This option had the advantage of placing the burden of conducting evaluations
on manufacturers, but retaining OSHA's role in determining standards for adequate evaluations.
However, the scheme would have required extensive agency resources to monitor compliance; it also
proved difficult to define an evaluation procedure appropriate for all substances, cf. L. BAcoW, supra
note 66, at 11 (diversity in health issues makes it difficult for OSHA to specify most effective means
for achieving objectives).
Adding an ingredient disclosure rule to HCS, in contrast, places the burden of evaluating chemicals
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manufacturers' potential tort liability for inadequate warnings, inducing
them to evaluate more carefully and disclose more often the chemical
hazards of their products. Compliance with an ingredient disclosure provi-
sion would also be easier for OSHA to monitor than compliance with the
current discretionary warning rule. Finally, ingredient lists would permit
worker representatives and physicians to conduct independent assessments
of the hazards of chemical products,"1 and would allow workers to make
better-informed decisions about the level of chemical injury risk they are
willing to bear.
A. Independent Hazard Verification
Some commentators argue that long lists of polysyllabic chemical names
would merely confuse workers, rather than inform them of hazards, 2 but
this argument misunderstands the way in which ingredient lists would be
used. Under an effective ingredient disclosure rule, hazard warnings
placed on containers would include only basic safety information;73 ingre-
dient information would be included in safety data sheets accompanying
products."' Workers who were not interested in this information would
not become confused, but would simply ignore it." On the other hand,
workers concerned that they were being exposed to highly dangerous
products would use ingredient lists. 6 They could take ingredient lists to
physicians for health risk evaluations or to aid in diagnosis of medical
problems. 7
on manufacturers; allows workers, employers, and the tort system to help police compliance; and
preserves flexibility in its hazard evaluation requirements.
71. Such assessments could now be carried out by taking products to chemical engineers for ingre-
dient analysis or by filing suit against all manufacturers possibly responsible for a plaintiff's injuries
and obtaining product ingredient lists through discovery. Both options would involve considerable
expense. Such situations, in which product information can be obtained much more cheaply by manu-
facturers than by purchasers or users, present the strongest case for mandated disclosure. Cf R. Pos-
NER, supra note 22, at 99 (duty to disclose should turn on which party can produce information at
lowest cost).
72. See, e.g., W. Viscusi supra note 2, at 158-59.
73. See Hadden, supra note 1, at 255-61 (describing elements of effective hazard labels).
74. Under HCS, employers must keep safety data sheets on file in an area readily ac .ssible to
employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 19 10.1200(g)(8) & (9) (1987).
75. Cf Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 226, 285-86 (1986) (consumers merely ignore information they find superfluous).
76. See W. LANDES & R. POSNERs, supra note 23, at 296-97 (discussing benefits of warnings and
ingredient labels when high risks are involved); see also M. BRYANT, SuCCESS wrrH OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY PROGRAMS 75 (Occupational Safety and Health Services, International Labor Office, No. 52,
1984) (proposing that model safety program for small company would include maintenance of readily
available register of workplace chemicals); J. STELLMAN & S. DAUM, WORK IS DANGEROUS TO
YOUR HEALTH 356-59 (1971) (describing program instituted by union local to maintain inventory of
workplace chemicals and accidents, worker health complaints, and safety precautions associated with
each substance).
77. See Levy & Wegman, Recognizing Occupational Disease, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, supra
note 47, at 29, 32, 34 (obtaining ingredient names is key step in diagnosing occupational diseases).
The cost of such evaluation would often be covered by workers' health insurance. Certain public
interest organizations also provide risk assessments for a nominal fee.
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Ingredient lists would make the job of health and safety experts eas-
ier." Instead of relying on manufacturers' evaluations, experts retained by
employers or unions could independently evaluate product hazards and
could assess any special hazards created by handling procedures or syner-
gistic reactions79 unique to particular workplaces.
B. Increasing the Threat of Tort Liability
If manufacturers were required to disclose product ingredients as well
as hazards, incentives against providing hazard warnings would decrease.
Victims would be better able to recognize and establish the link between
their injuries and inadequately labeled chemical products. Manufacturers
who omitted warnings to make products more marketable would therefore
face a greater threat of private liability actions.8" Heightened liability con-
cerns would induce manufacturers to err on the side of disclosure when
deciding whether hazard warnings were necessary. 1 Coupled with an in-
gredient disclosure requirement, the discretionary "professional judgment"
standard for hazard warnings under HCS would be more adequate. Man-
ufacturers could be expected to use their best professional judgment to
avoid liability for inadequate warning labels.8 2
C. Workable Administrative Enforcement
An ingredient disclosure requirement would be easier to enforce admin-
istratively than HCS as currently designed because employers and work-
ers, as well as OSHA compliance officers, could monitor whether manu-
78. See M. BRYANT, supra note 76, at 14 (substance analysis is key step in setting up workplace
safety programs); J. STELLMAN & S. DAUM, supra note 76, at 328 (first step in workplace environ-
mental monitoring is ascertaining chemical identities; "when unknown materials are involved, identifi-
cation and analysis can become a real scientific challenge").
79. Synergism occurs when the "total effect of two active components in a mixture is greater than
the sum of the two parts." MCGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMs
1598 (1984). See, e.g., S. EPSTEIN, supra note 63, at 120 (potent carcinogen BCME may be formed
in reactions); Riihimaki, Interactions between Industrial Solvents, in BIOLOGICAL MONITORING
AND SURVEILLANCE OF WORKERS 231, 241 (1984) (discussing importance of synergism in causing
toxicity of certain solvent mixtures).
80. Difficulties in proving causation in chemical disease cases would continue, of course, but with
identity information, two major problems-victims' lack of awareness of the causes of disease, and
their inability to establish the ioentity and manufacturer of the product causing their harm-would be
ameliorated.
81. Cf McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information,
93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 844 (1980) (if safety data were publicly available, threat of scrutiny by
critical outsiders would motivate industry to analyze it more carefully).
82. No private cause of action exists under the OSH Act for violations of its provisions, see supra
note 17, so suits concerning chemical injuries with long latency periods might not take place for years.
Accurate ingredient lists would increase the chances that these suits would succeed: Ingredient lists
could be used to evaluate hazard warnings prepared when the product was marketed in light of the
medical knowledge available at the time, and determinations that warnings were inadequate could
inspire decisions to proceed with suits. Recognizing the likelihood of increased liability in the future,
manufacturers would be deterred from inadequate labeling in the present.
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facturers listed product ingredients. 8 OSHA would have little difficulty
proving per se violations of the disclosure rule; a lack of an ingredient list
would be conclusive evidence of noncompliance." Although detecting and
proving the inadequacy of hazard warnings would still require the atten-
tion of expert agency personnel, the need for agency enforcement of this
provision would decrease due to the increased compliance incentives cre-
ated by the tort system.
D. Independent Decisionmaking by Workers
Ingredient disclosure would also have the advantage of allowing work-
ers to make their own decisions about the acceptability of workplace risk
levels. With ingredient lists, workers could obtain independent assess-
ments of the hazards posed by industrial chemical products."' According
to their own preferences, workers could take individual safety precautions
or seek less dangerous work. 86 Workers represented by unions8 could
bargain collectively with employers88 for safer conditions" or higher com-
pensation for risk.90
83. Cf L. BACOW, supra note 66, at 68 (steelworkers filed suit to enforce standard for coke-oven
emissions); id. at 102 (OSHA often relies on unions to identify hazards, pressure management to
comply with regulations, and bring violations to OSHA's attention).
84. Manufacturers could provide incomplete ingredient lists, however, leaving off hazardous in-
gredients in order to make products appear safe. This form of noncompliance would be difficult to
detect; products would have to be submitted to chemical analyses, which could be very costly. To deter
such omissions, OSHA would have to set a severe penalty for such behavior, counterbalancing the
small chance of detection by the severity of punishment.
85. Such assessments could be obtained from physicians, union representatives, or public interest
groups.
86. See W. Viscusi, supra note 32 (empirical study found that workers are twice as likely to quit
jobs they perceive as hazardous, and ill-informed workers accept more hazardous work than those
who are better informed).
Workers who lack the job mobility or bargaining power to demand safety improvements or to leave
dangerous jobs, see supra note 47, could not avail themselves of this option, but more accurate hazard
information would at least serve to inform policymakers of the conditions under which these employ-
ees are forced to work.
87. In 1980, 25.2% of the nonagricultural workforce in the United States belonged to labor un-
ions. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 424, table 709 (105th ed. 1985).
88. Unions have attempted to obtain ingredient information through bargaining, but have met
with resistance from employers. See, e.g., Borden Chem. Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 64 (1982); Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 90 (1982); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 27 (1982)
(finding companies to have committed unfair labor practices in refusing to disclose to union identities
of chemicals not claimed as trade secrets).
89. Though hampered by lack of information about the nature of chemical hazards, bargaining
over health and safety issues already occurs between unions and employers. See, e.g., L. BAcow,
supra note 66, at 68-70 (describing steelworkers contract obtaining job rotation, increased incentive
pay and engineering controls for workers exposed to hazardous coke-oven emissions). More than 84%
of union contracts contain health and safety provisions, Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA)
§ 95 (1986), which can include provisions for protective equipment, id. § 95, at 145; hiring industrial
hygienists, id. § 95, at 147; medical monitoring of workers in at-risk positions, id. § 95, at 301; joint
management-union safety committees to identify and remedy hazardous conditions, id. § 95, at
181-82; and the right to refuse hazardous work, id. § 95, at 241.
90. See W. Viscusi, supra note 2, at 3-5, 37-44; W. Viscus, supra note 32, at 250-51, 263.
Viscusi's empirical work establishes that workers who are aware of the risk they face on hazardous
jobs will demand substantial wage premiums to take these positions. These demands give firms a
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Access to ingredient information would also improve physicians' ability
to diagnose and treat chemically induced illnesses, and to detect dangerous
synergism91 between chemicals. Finally, such a requirement might speed
gains in scientific knowledge, making it easier to spot the link between
diseases and particular chemical agents.92
IV. THE TRADE SECRETS ISSUE
Businesses have protested that mandated ingredient disclosure would
force them to reveal valuable trade secrets.9 3 Manufacturers can make few
bona fide trade secret claims against ingredient disclosure, however, and
secrets that are established as bona fide can be protected through agency
procedures. Some harm to manufacturers' interests may nevertheless occur
from the disclosure of proprietary information that is not legally accorded
trade secret status. Congress must balance this potential harm against the
benefits of disclosure.
A. Provisions for Bona Fide Trade Secrets
As do other ingredient disclosure laws, a rule for industrial chemicals
could include procedures to protect manufacturers' bona fide trade
secrets." Courts have generally held that the protection granted trade
secrets under agency disclosure rules should match that offered under state
trade secrets law.95 Under state common law trade secrets doctrines, man-
ufacturers can raise only a restricted set of claims against an ingredient
disclosure rule.
The common law of trade secrets does not protect information discover-
able by examining public documents" or analyzing a product.9 7 Nor may
choice between paying risk premiums or reducing wage costs by investing in safety equipment. Viscusi
concludes that this choice creates a powerful incentive for firms to invest in safety of approximately
$70 billion annually, or 3,000 times the total annual fines levied by OSHA.
91. See supra note 79.
92. See, e.g., Note, supra note 20, at 155 n.64 (identity information was required to link workers'
sterility to exposure to pesticide).
93. See, e.g., Statement of Master Chemical Corporation for the Public Hearings on the Depart-
ment of Labor's Proposed Rule on Hazard Communication 2 (July 27, 1982) (on file at OSHA
Docket Office) [hereinafter Master Chemical Testimony] ("chemical identity disclosure . . . would
jeopardize the existence of small chemical firms").
94. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 20.44 (1987) (providing for applications for exemption from disclosure of
confidential information under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
95. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 740 (3d Cir. 1985) (invalidating
trade secret provisions of HCS because they protected chemical identities discoverable through chemi-
cal analysis, which are not protected under state law).
96. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS AcT § 1, commissioners' comment, 14 U.L.A. 541 (1980 & Supp. 1987).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts does not examine trade secrets, and many courts continue to rely
on the original Restatement definition. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
474-75 (1974). Sixteen states have adopted versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, see 14 U.L.A.
309 (Supp. 1987), which retains the Restatement definitions of trade secrets to the extent relevant
here.
97. RESTATEMENT, supra note 96; UNIF. TRADE SEcRETs AcT § 1, commissioners' comment, 14
[Vol. 97: 581
1988] Hazardous Mix
businesses claim trade secret status for information that is of little value9 8
or insufficient in itself to give competitors a valuable advantage if known
by them." Each of these requirements eliminates certain classes of chemi-
cals from the scope of those raising trade secret concerns.
Ingredient information for industrial chemicals marketed in the United
States may already be subject to public disclosure under the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA). 00 The ingredients in all industrial chemi-
cals marketed in western Europe are also subject to European Economic
Community (EEC) chemical labeling and reporting requirements,'01
which have led to disclosure of many confidential chemical identities. 2
Finally, ingredients in patented chemicals are not trade secrets, as they
are on file at the Patent Office.
Ingredient disclosure also would not reveal trade secrets of manufactur-
ers of basic chemicals.10 3 Similarly, no trade secret problem would arise if
ingredients could be discovered through chemical analysis, or if knowledge
of ingredients alone would give competitors no advantage because they
would be unable to duplicate the product without also knowing the
formula, process, or proportions used.'" Given all these restrictions, man-
U.L.A. 541.
98. RESTATEMENT, supra note 96; UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 541.
99. RESTATEMENT, supra note 96, comment b; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A.
541.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982). The TSCA requires the EPA to disclose, in response to request,
"any health and safety study. . . with respect to any chemical substance. . . offered for commercial
distribution," except process and portion information marked by the submitter as proprietary. Id. §
2613(b); see also 40 C.F.R. § 2.306 (1986) (implementing this provision of TSCA).
Whether this provision requires ingredient disclosure is a matter of some debate. See McGarity &
Shapiro, supra note 81, at 876-77 (summarizing arguments about whether ingredient information
should be disclosed under TSCA and arguing that problem only arises for chemicals not marketed
publicly since most identities are ascertainable through chemical analysis). Ingredient information that
is not asserted as proprietary by submitters dearly is subject to EPA disclosure. See 40 C.F.R. §§
2.203(b)-(c), 2.204(b)-(c)(2)(i).
101. See Council Directive of 18 Sept. 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 259) 10 (1979)
(known as the Sixth Amendment).
102. Under EEC regulations, manufacturers must disclose exact chemical names on the labels of
their products, id. art. 16, at 16, eliminating the trade secret status of ingredients in products exported
to EEC member countries. More than 20% of the chemical mixtures produced in the United States
are exported to member countries. European Community, U.S. to Meet Again on Goal to Harmonize
International Labels, 16 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1068 (Mar. 11, 1987); see also Biles, Har-
monizing the Regulation of Ne- Chemicals in the United States and in the European Economic
Community, in TSCA's IMPACT ON SOCIETY AND THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 39 (1983); O'Reilly,
Confidentiality of Chemical Identities, in TSCA's IMPACT ON SOCIETY AND THE CHEMICAL INDUS-
TRY, supra, at 133 (discussing impact of EEC regulations on American chemical industry).
103. As one manufacturer testified during public hearings on HCS, "basic chemical" manufactur-
ers do not have trade secret concerns because for them "it is usually the process rather than the
chemical identity that is considered a trade secret[;] . . . the identity of the basic chemical has no
intrinsic value." Master Chemical Testimony, supra note 93, at 3.
104. Requiring manufacturers to disclose information about the concentrations of ingredients in
their products might provide additional useful information to those seeking to evaluate product
hazards; however, such a requirement would also increase the potential for trade secrets disclosure.
Mindful of the need to balance workers' and manufacturers' interests, this Note does not propose
disclosure of ingredient concentrations.
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 581
ufacturers would have few bona fide trade secret claims against product
ingredient disclosure."0 5
Some legitimate trade secret concerns remain."° To protect legitimate
trade secrets, a procedure should be established under which manufactur-
ers could apply to OSHA for exemptions from ingredient disclosure on
trade secret grounds. Reviewing manufacturers' trade secret applications
would require OSHA resources. The resources needed could be mini-
mized, however, by placing the burden of proving claims on manufactur-
ers, rather than requiring OSHA to disprove trade secret claims, as HCS
currently does.1°7
Shifting the burden of proof to manufacturers would prevent a trade
secrets exemption from swallowing the rule, a result which many com-
mentators argued would occur under HCS.10 8 Manufacturers applying for
exemption should be required to prove that product ingredients are en-
tirely secret-not subject to public disclosure under TSCA, EEC regula-
tions or other laws, and unidentifiable through chemical analysis-and of
significant value to competitors in and of themselves. OSHA could con-
duct special reviews of the adequacy of hazard warnings for products sur-
viving this test for exemption.10 9
B. Disclosure of Proprietary Information Without Trade Secret Status
To determine whether agency disclosure of proprietary business infor-
mation is appropriate, courts balance10 society's interest in disclosure-
105. For example, Polaroid found that it did not have to claim trade secret status for the chemical
identity of a single product whose ingredients had to be disclosed under Massachusetts' right-to-know
law. Chemical Hazards at Work, supra note 60, at 338. Similarly, in an unfair labor practices case
against an adhesives manufacturer who refused to give its union ingredient information, the manufac-
turer admitted that only one of its 700 chemical products contained an ingredient that could be consid-
ered a trade secret. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 27, 41 (1982).
106. For manufacturers of certain chemical mixtures, for example, "the ingredient information is
the crucial trade secret, very often the only trade secret." Master Chemical Testimony. supra note 93,
at 3.
Another class of chemicals raising legitimate trade secret concerns are catalysts, which do not ap-
pear in end products and are not publicly marketed, but are introduced in manufacturing processes to
speed reactions. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 81, at 878. Under the proposed rule, the identi-
ties of these in-house chemicals would be disclosed only to the workers handling them; secrecy could
be ensured through use of confidentiality agreements.
107. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i)(10) (1987).
108. See Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 1281-82. If trade secret claims are presumed
valid subject to agency review, a loophole is created in the standard: Companies may avoid complying
with the ingredient disclosure provisions by filing trade secret claims for most of their products. Cf
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (business cannot be
judge of what information constitutes trade secrets). To further deter manufacturers from abusing the
trade secret exemption, a fine could be imposed for the filing of frivolous claims.
109. Although it is possible that conducting such assessments would place a burden on OSHA, it
is more likely that few products would withstand a stringent trade secrets test. See supra note 105.
110. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 534 F.2d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 1976) (deci-
sions as to appropriateness of public disclosure of trade secret information require "balancing of the
public and private interests").
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such as protecting the public from unknown health risks" -against soci-
ety's interest in preserving trade secrets-such as the creation of incentives
for innovation.112 Courts may also look to the statutory authority under
which the agency promulgated a disclosure rule to determine whether
Congress intended to authorize such action. " '
In many other contexts, Congress has determined that the benefits of
ingredient disclosure outweigh the costs. For example, manufacturers are
required to disclose ingredients in cosmetics,11 many foods,' 15 prescription
drugs,' pesticides," 7 and hazardous consumer products." 8 Requiring
disclosure of ingredients in industrial chemical products would fill a gap
in this already extensive network of ingredient disclosure laws." 9
The social costs120 resulting from workers' exposure to hazardous in-
dustrial chemicals weigh heavily in favor of requiring a disclosure rule
despite the potential for some damage to proprietary information.' 2 ' The
language of the OSH Act, mandating that the agency require use of labels
"to insure that employees are apprised of all hazards to which they are
111. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015-16 (1984) (Congress may determine
optimal amount of disclosure to assure product safety and allow individuals to assess risks for them-
selves); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1289 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(public interest may require disclosure of health and safety information in spite of policy protecting
proprietary interests); cf. Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1919) ("right of a
manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds . . . must be held subject to the right of the
State . . .to require that the nature of the product be fairly set forth").
112. See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
113. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979) (nexus must exist between disclosure
regulation and delegation of legislative authority for its promulgation).
114. 21 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1987).
115. 21 C.F.R. § 101.3-.4 (1987).
116. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1982); 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.10, .50, .57(a)(vi), .100(b)(4)-(5) (1987).
117. 40 C.F.R. § 162.10(a)(vi)(g) (1987).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(b) (1987).
119. HCS exempts substances covered by these laws from its coverage. 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1200(b)(4)(i), (ii) & (iv) (1987).
120. See supra notes 3-5.
121. If the procedure described above successfully protects manufacturers from trade secret dam-
age, an ingredient disclosure rule might be said to be more "efficient" than HCS in the sense of being
"Pareto superior" to it: The rule would make some parties-workers-better off, while leaving none
worse off. See R. CooTrR & T. ULEN, supra note 32, at 49-50. Regulatory interventions cannot be
proven to be Pareto superior to market results, however, because the affected parties have not affirmed
the superiority of the result through voluntary exchanges among themselves, see TRAGIC CHOICES,
supra note 16, at 84, and because price increases resulting from regulation make some parties worse
off.
The rule's superior efficiency therefore must be justified in economic terms as a "potential Pareto
improvement:" It must improve the welfare of those benefiting from it more than it damages the
welfare of those made worse off. See R. CooTaR & T. ULEu, supra note 32, at 50-51. Thus, an
ingredient disclosure rule would be more efficient than HCS if the benefits to workers of ingredient
information outweigh the costs to manufacturers of disclosure. Costs imposed by the proposed rule
include those incurred by manufacturers conducting more extensive hazard evaluations to protect
themselves from liability for inadequate warnings. See supra Section III-B. These costs will clearly be
efficient, however; manufacturers will cease expending resources on hazard evaluations when the costs
of additional research begin to exceed expected liability costs. Additional costs in the form of addi-
tional paperwork will be insignificant, as these costs are already imposed by HCS. An ingredient
disclosure rule therefore results in significant benefits for workers, without imposing excessive addi-
tional costs on manufacturers.
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exposed," '122 suggests that Congress authorized OSHA to promulgate such
a rule. The vagueness of the Act.. 3 may leave this question in some dis-
pute, however, and explicit Congressional authorization of an ingredient
disclosure rule would therefore be desirable. 2 Congress should pass leg-
islation 125 directing OSHA to develop a chemical hazard labeling standard
requiring disclosure of product ingredients as well as hazards, subject to a
procedure protecting manufacturers' narrowly defined, bona fide trade
secrets.
IV. CONCLUSION
Inefficiencies in the market for industrial chemical products have given
rise to incentives against the provision of adequate product hazard warn-
ings. A rule requiring chemical manufacturers to provide hazard informa-
tion must therefore create strong incentives for compliance, an objective
that HCS, with its highly discretionary hazard evaluation provisions,
failed to accomplish.
Legislation amending HCS to require disclosure of product ingredients
as well as hazards will create the compliance incentives HCS now lacks.
With product ingredient information, interested parties-union represent-
atives, public interest organizations, plaintiffs' lawyers, and physi-
cians-will be able to conduct independent hazard assessments and moni-
122. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1982).
123. See supra note 7.
124. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 1269.
125. Amending HCS through legislation rather than agency action has the added benefit of dis-
pelling the confusion created by the Supreme Court's construction of the OSH Act in Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Benzene). In that decision, a plural-
ity of the Court held that before promulgating standards, OSHA must establish the existence of a
"significant risk of harm." Id. at 642. This holding was interpreted in Bingham v. Louisiana Chem.
Ass'n, 657 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981), to bar OSHA from promulgating standards for "possible
hazards," id. at 782, as opposed to "particular hazards already identified," id. at 785; see also supra
note 11 (discussing significance of defining rules as "standards," as opposed to "regulations," under
the OSH Act).
Under Benzene, as interpreted by Bingham, OSHA cannot fulfill its statutory mandate "to set the
standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health . . . even if such employee has
regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard." 29 U.S.C. § 655(5) (1982). Because the
hazards of chemicals can be conclusively established only after years of worker exposure reveal a
pattern of disease or death, see Note, Trans-Science in Torts, 96 YALE LJ. 428, 429 (1986), barring
OSHA from promulgating standards on the basis of preliminary hazard evidence will necessarily
result in avoidable harm.
That Benzene tends to obstruct justified rulemaking efforts is demonstrated by the subsequent his-
tory of the case itself. After the Court invalidated OSHA's lower exposure limit for benzene on the
ground that inadequate evidence justified the need for a stricter standard, several studies documented
that workers exposed to permissible levels of benzene were many times more likely to develop leuke-
mia and other blood disorders than the general population. See Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52
Fed. Reg. 34,460, 34,462-63 (1987). On the basis of these new studies, OSHA again lowered its
permissible exposure level for benzene. Id.
A statute directing OSHA to promulgate an across-the-board ingredient disclosure requirement
would implicitly demonstrate, or could explicitly state, that Congress intends OSHA to promulgate
reasonable rules for potential workplace hazards as well as for "conclusively established" ones.
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tor the adequacy of manufacturers' warnings. Workers who become ill
from exposure to harmful products will be better able to identify and doc-
ument the causes of their diseases, increasing manufacturers' liability con-
cerns and inducing them to err on the side of disclosure in preparing haz-
ard warnings. Finally, the ability to conduct independent hazard
assessments will allow the purchasers of industrial chemical products, and
the workers exposed to them, to make better informed decisions about how
to respond to product dangers.

